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Département d'Histoire**

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# UE1 Fondamentale – Temps Présent, la France en Europe

## Histoire de l'Europe Contemporaine

Épreuve de 4h

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### Sujet au choix

#### Dissertation

Antimodernes et réactionnaires

**OU**

#### Commentaire de texte

#### L'adresse inaugurale de l'AIT (1864)

« En vérité, si nous tenons compte de la différence des circonstances locales, nous voyons les faits anglais se reproduire sur une plus petite échelle, dans tous les pays industriels et progressifs du continent. Depuis 1848, un développement inouï de l'industrie et une expansion inimaginable des exportations et des importations ont eu lieu dans ces pays. Partout « la montée de richesses et de puissance entièrement limitée aux classes possédantes » a été réellement « vertigineuse ». Partout, comme en Angleterre, une petite minorité de la classe ouvrière a obtenu une légère augmentation du salaire réel ; mais, dans la plupart des cas, la hausse du salaire nominal ne dénotait pas l'accroissement du bien-être des salariés [...] ; partout les grandes masses de la classe laborieuse descendaient toujours plus bas, dans la même proportion au moins que les classes placées au-dessus d'elle montaient plus haut sur l'échelle sociale. Dans tous les pays de l'Europe [...] ni le perfectionnement des machines, ni l'application de la science à la production, ni la découverte de nouvelles communications, ni les nouvelles colonies, ni l'émigration, ni la création de nouveaux débouchés, ni le libre-échange, ni toutes ces choses ensemble ne supprimeront la misère des classes laborieuses ; au contraire, tant qu'existera la base défectueuse d'aujourd'hui, chaque nouveau progrès des forces productives du travail aggravera de toute nécessité les contrastes sociaux et fera davantage ressortir l'antagonisme social. [...]

Après la défaite des révolutions de 1848, toutes les associations et tous les journaux politiques des classes ouvrières furent écrasés sur le continent par la main brutale de la force. [...] Cependant cette période écoulée depuis les révolutions de 1848 a eu aussi ses compensations. [...] Après une lutte de trente années, soutenue avec la plus admirable persévérance, la classe ouvrière anglaise [...] réussit à enlever le bill des dix heures. [...] La plupart des gouvernements continentaux furent obligés d'accepter la loi anglaise dans les manufactures. [...] Le bill des dix heures ne fut donc pas seulement un important succès pratique ; ce fut aussi le triomphe d'un principe ; pour la première fois, au grand jour, l'économie politique de la bourgeoisie avait été battue par l'économie politique de la classe ouvrière. [...] Mais les seigneurs de la terre et les seigneurs du capital se servent toujours de leurs privilèges politiques pour défendre et perpétuer leurs privilèges économiques. Bien loin de pousser à l'émancipation du travail, ils continueront à y opposer le plus d'obstacles possible. [...]

La conquête du pouvoir politique est donc devenue le premier devoir de la classe ouvrière. Elle semble l'avoir compris, car en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie, en France, on a vu renaître en même temps ces aspirations communes, et en même temps aussi des efforts ont été faits pour réorganiser politiquement le parti des travailleurs. Il est un élément de succès que ce parti possède : il a le nombre ; mais le nombre ne pèse dans la balance que s'il est uni par l'association et guidé par le savoir. L'expérience du passé nous a appris comment l'oubli de ces liens fraternels qui doivent exister entre les travailleurs des différents pays et les exciter à se soutenir les uns les autres dans toutes leurs luttes pour l'affranchissement, sera puni par la défaite commune de leurs entreprises divisées. C'est poussés par cette pensée que les travailleurs de différents pays, réunis en un meeting public à Saint-Martin's Hall le 28 septembre 1864, ont résolu de fonder l'Association Internationale.

Une autre conviction encore a inspiré ce meeting.

Si l'émancipation des classes travailleuses requiert leur union et leur concours fraternels, comment pourraient-elles accomplir cette grande mission si une politique étrangère, qui poursuit des desseins criminels, met en jeu les préjugés nationaux et fait couler dans des guerres de piraterie le sang et dilapide le bien du peuple ? [...] L'approbation sans pudeur, la sympathie dérisoire ou l'indifférence stupide avec lesquelles les classes supérieures d'Europe ont vu la Russie saisir comme une proie les montagnes-forteresse du Caucase et assassiner l'héroïque Pologne, les empiétements immenses et sans entrave de cette puissance barbare dont la tête est à Saint-Pétersbourg et dont on retrouve la main dans tous les cabinets d'Europe, ont appris aux travailleurs qu'il leur fallait se mettre au courant des mystères de la politique internationale, surveiller la conduite diplomatique de leurs gouvernements respectifs, la combattre au besoin par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, et enfin lorsqu'ils seraient impuissants à rien empêcher, s'entendre pour une protestation commune et revendiquer les simples lois de la morale et de la justice qui devraient gouverner les rapports entre individus, comme lois suprêmes dans le commerce des nations. Combattre pour une politique étrangère de cette nature, c'est prendre part à la lutte générale pour l'affranchissement des travailleurs.

Prolétaires de tous les pays, unissez-vous ! »

**UE1 Fondamentale – Temps Présent, la France en Europe**  
**L'Europe dynamiques, constructions, institutions**  
Épreuve de 4h

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**Dissertation**

Une américanisation de la vie culturelle française (1945-1991) ?

# UE2 Fondamentale – Sociologie Politique

Épreuve de 4h

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L'action politique ne peut se limiter à la politique institutionnelle. Quelles sont les principales pistes élaborées par les sciences sociales pour appréhender les formes de mobilisation politique ne s'inscrivant pas dans le fonctionnement "normal" de la vie politique ?

# UE3 Fondamentale – Philosophie Politique

Épreuve de 4h

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## Sujet au choix

### Dissertation

Quels obstacles la liberté politique rencontre-t-elle pour devenir une réalité ?

### OU

### Explication de texte

La première et la plus importante maxime du gouvernement légitime ou populaire, c'est-à-dire de celui qui a pour objet le bien du peuple, est donc, comme je l'ai dit, de suivre en tout la volonté générale ; mais pour la suivre il faut la connaître, et surtout bien la distinguer de la volonté particulière en commençant par soi-même ; distinction toujours fort difficile à faire, et pour laquelle il n'appartient qu'à la plus sublime vertu de donner de suffisantes lumières. Comme pour vouloir il faut être libre, une autre difficulté qui n'est guère moindre, est d'assurer à la fois la liberté publique et l'autorité du gouvernement. Cherchez les motifs qui ont porté les hommes unis par leurs besoins mutuels dans la grande société, à s'unir plus étroitement par des sociétés civiles ; vous n'en trouverez point d'autre que celui d'assurer les biens, la vie, et la liberté de chaque membre par la protection de tous : or comment forcer les hommes à défendre la liberté de l'un d'entre eux, sans porter atteinte à celle des autres ? Et comment pourvoir aux besoins publics sans altérer la propriété particulière de ceux qu'on force d'y contribuer ? De quelques sophismes qu'on puisse colorer tout cela, il est certain que si l'on peut contraindre ma volonté, je ne suis plus libre, et que je ne suis plus maître de mon bien, si quelque autre peut y toucher. Cette difficulté, qui devait sembler insurmontable, a été levée avec la première par la plus sublime de toutes les institutions humaines, ou plutôt par une inspiration céleste, qui apprit à l'homme à imiter ici-bas les décrets immuables de la divinité. Par quel art inconcevable a-t-on pu trouver le moyen d'assujettir les hommes pour les rendre libres ? D'employer au service de l'Etat les biens, les bras, et la vie même de tous ses membres, sans les contraindre et sans les consulter ? D'enchaîner leur volonté de leur propre aveu ? De faire valoir leur consentement contre leur refus, et de les forcer à se punir eux-mêmes quand ils font ce qu'ils n'ont pas voulu ? Comment peut-il se faire qu'ils obéissent et que personne ne commande, qu'ils servent et n'aient point de maître ; d'autant plus libres en effet que sous une apparente sujétion, nul ne perd de sa liberté que ce qui peut nuire à celle d'un autre ? Ces prodiges sont l'ouvrage de la loi. C'est à la loi seule que les hommes doivent la justice et la liberté. C'est cet organe salubre de la volonté de tous, qui rétablit dans le droit l'égalité naturelle entre les hommes. C'est cette voix céleste qui dicte à chaque citoyen les préceptes de la raison publique, et lui apprend à agir selon les maximes de son propre jugement, et à n'être pas en contradiction avec lui-même. C'est elle seule aussi que les chefs doivent faire parler quand ils commandent ; car sitôt qu'indépendamment des lois, un homme en prétend soumettre un autre à sa volonté privée, il sort à l'instant de l'état civil, et se met vis-à-vis de lui dans le pur état de nature où l'obéissance n'est jamais prescrite que par la nécessité.

Rousseau, *Discours sur l'économie politique* (1755)

# UE4 Méthodologie – Civilisation Anglo Saxonne

## Épreuve de 2h

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### VOCABULARY

Find the English equivalents in the text for the following words (given in chronological order) **/7,5**

Conséquences	Ministre de l'intérieur	Maîtrisé, contrôlé
Annoncer	Puissant	Fardeau
Grands boulevards	Acceptation totale	Un franc-tireur de droite
Un flot de	Encadrement des salaires	Miner, accabler
Agitation, trouble	Revendications salariales	Diminuer, freiner
Effondrement	Menace	Férocité
Taux de natalité	Mandat de premier ministre	Décliner
Une crise sévère	Un rythme moindre	Correspondre, être concomitant de
Soutenu par, approuvé par	Associé	Achat
Adversité, hostilité	Renflouement	Biens de consommation



**TRANSLATE THE ITALICIZED PASSAGE INTO FRENCH /7,5**

*Of course, many commentators gave exaggerated, politically prejudiced, verdicts on the Winter of Discontent. Not all workers were on strike all the time. Many of them were very brief and unco-ordinated. Some of the wage claims, including by the miners, had much justification at an inflationary period even if high wage settlements made that inflation worse. Many were provoked by insensitive and right-wing employers with poor management skills. But it would be absurd to deny that something very unusual and alarming was taking place' A total of 29,474,000 working days were lost in 1979, easily the worst since 1943 (the next worst were also in the seventies, the second highest in 1972 with 23,909,000 and the third 1975 with 14,750,000). In all, 4,583,000 workers were involved in 1979 and there was a massive loss of production. The psyche of the country was deeply shaken.*

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WITHOUT COPYING FROM THE TEXT /20**

1. How would you describe the swinging sixties?
2. What was the post-war political consensus which lasted until the 1970s?
3. Why was Great Britain called the sick man of Europe?
4. Who exaggerated the impact of the winter of discontent? Why?
5. What was the role of the trade unions in the political changes which happened in the 1970s?
6. Why were there racial tensions?
7. What were the more positive changes which occurred in the 1960s and 70s?

**GRAMMAR /15**

Translate the sentences below paying much attention to the choice of tenses

1. La pauvreté est plus étendue au nord qu'au sud de l'Angleterre.
2. La pauvreté s'aggrave en ce moment à cause de la crise.
3. Il y a quelques années, beaucoup d'enfants vivaient sous le seuil de pauvreté.
4. A cause de la faillite de plusieurs entreprises la pauvreté va augmenter.
5. Un jour les politiciens trouveront comment réduire les inégalités.
6. Ces dernières années, le chômage a augmenté.
7. Le chômage chez les jeunes augmente depuis plusieurs années.
8. Les économistes ont élaboré plusieurs modèles pour arriver au plein-emploi mais jusqu'à présent aucune n'a été très efficace.

9. Le *Winter of discontent* a débuté en 1978 ; beaucoup de travailleurs se sont mis en grève.
10. Le gouvernement avait limité l'augmentation des salaires et les syndicats avaient protesté.
11. Les ouvriers réclamaient des hausses de salaire depuis des mois quand le gouvernement a imposé des restrictions.
12. Le premier ministre, dont les décisions étaient populaires, fut réélu.
13. Le maire, avec qui les citoyens discutent pendant des heures, réclame plus d'argent pour sa commune.
14. Depuis le début des grèves, les personnes qui sont isolées, souffrent beaucoup.
15. Les économistes étudient depuis des années le mécanisme de l'inflation.

## Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour?

**Kenneth O. Morgan**

In popular recollection, the 1970s have gone down as the dark ages, Britain's gloomiest period since the Second World War. It may be that the aftermath of the Brexit vote in 2016 will herald a period of even greater crisis, but for the moment the sombre seventies, set between Harold Wilson's 'swinging sixties' and Margaret Thatcher's divisive eighties, stand alone. They began with massive trade union stoppages against Heath's Industrial Relations Act. They continued with the financial crisis of the IMF and the random atrocities of the Irish Republicans. They ended with the 'Winter of Discontent'. The earlier years of the decade featured not only many strikes by the engineers and electrical workers, but Edward Heath's catastrophic three-day week in response to the miners' strike of 1974 when London's major thoroughfares were cast into darkness, shops and restaurants were unlit and gloomy, public television services were suspended for several nights a week, and suburban families ate their sombre dinners at home not very romantically with the light of such spare candles as shopkeepers still had available.

This popular gloom was echoed, indeed reinforced, by historians and political commentators. In the late seventies, there was a flood of pessimistic literature, particularly from Americans, on the state of the nation – *The Future that Doesn't Work: Social Democracy's Failures in Britain* (1977), *The Politics of Economic Decline* (1979), *Britain: Progress and Decline* (1980), and, most evocative of all, Isaac Kramnick's *Is Britain Dying?* (1979). A serious academic account of the IMF crisis in late 1976 was entitled, somewhat absurdly, *Goodbye Great Britain*. Everything was going wrong. There was turmoil in industry and a collapse of public services from schools to cemeteries, a growing mood of very un-British violence from the IRA to battered wives, there was ethnic tension, the population was ageing and the birth-rate falling. Were the dark ages an exaggerated fabrication of excited journalists and ill-disposed foreigners? Or did the seventies uncover something fundamentally wrong about this ancient people which survives to diminish its authority and restrict its vision down to the present day? The negative aspects of Britain in the seventies, on which commentators focused, were essentially four. These were conflict and class war in industry, a sharp downturn in the economy, a flight to extremism in political life, and a rise in public and domestic violence. Without doubt, each of these revealed a new pattern of internal vulnerability not experienced previously, and a marked contrast with the stable social democracy that the United Kingdom had appeared to be since the second world war, both under Labour's welfare democracy under Attlee after 1945 and Wilson after 1964, and the thirteen years of emollient 'one-nation Toryism' in between. Now there were new challenges to which a post-imperial, once-great power seemed unable to respond.

The **social conflict in industry**, certainly, was on a scale and of a character not experienced since the days of the Triple Alliance, Black Friday and the General Strike between 1919 and 1926. It is true that warning signs of future conflict had been evident in the later sixties. The Donovan report of 1968 illustrated how the internal structures of leadership in the unions had been changing in the sixties with power increasingly passing to shop stewards. National collective bargaining was becoming localised which gave militants on the shop floor more power. Barbara Castle, backed by the prime minister, Harold Wilson, had tried to deal with this by legislation but her 1969 Industrial Relations Bill was strongly opposed by the unions. It met with its nemesis in Cabinet, the main opponent being no less than the Home Secretary, Jim Callaghan. But the turmoil provoked by Heath's 1971 Industrial Relations Act was of a quite different order. It was a dangerous attempt to apply legal sanctions to industrial relations which had been governed by voluntary collective bargaining since the 1906 Trades Disputes Act, a policy which the Donovan report had previously supported. The irony

was that the unions had carefully observed the terms of the Act – and yet the strikes went on. Furthermore, the trade unions were now primed for battle as never before. Their membership had been rising fast, reaching a record 13,498,000 in 1979, growing spectacularly amongst white-collar workers, with unions like NUPE and NALGO recruiting strongly amongst local government workers and amongst groups such as health service workers and schoolteachers. The unions now had immensely powerful national officials like Jack Jones, secretary of the mighty Transport and General Union, with well over a million members. Frightened journalists wrote of ‘The Emperor Jones’ and of the ‘terrible twins’, Jones and his associate Hugh Scanlon of the Engineers. Heath’s Industrial Relation Act of 1971 led to the largest trade union protests for two generations. Worse still followed with two national coal miners’ strikes in 1972 and the beginning of 1974, the first such since 1926. They were solidly backed by the TUC’s general secretary, Vic Feather. The first led to a total surrender to the wage and bonus demands of the miners (a surrender duly noted by the government’s Minister for Education, Margaret Thatcher). The second in January 1974 led to a national state of emergency, the three-day week and a general election called by Heath on the theme ‘Who Governs Britain?’ The answer appeared to be the unions since Heath was defeated and had to resign.

The union troubles, however, continued to mount up alarmingly under Labour. Wilson and Callaghan had concluded a so-called ‘social contract’ with the TUC under which the unions would supposedly observe wage restraint while legislation sympathetic to their wishes went through. Strikes continued, many of them unofficial, and wage claims mounted, driving the level of price inflation up to almost 30 per cent. All manner of workers were now engaged including key groups not previously considered as a threat such as the water workers. The worst of the class war came, ironically, under the premiership of James Callaghan. Fanned by a background of lagging pay increases and reviving price inflation, there erupted a massive series of industrial disputes that lasted from late October 1978 to the spring of 1979. These were random, often quite uncoordinated affairs. There were large unions on strike like the Transport and General Workers. But there was also a wide array of almost nihilistic local strikes which impacted directly on the public. Striking dustmen meant that putrid rubbish bins were not collected and emptied, children were kept out of school by striking school care-takers, hospital wards were closed by striking health workers and patients died. In one especially notorious episode, Liverpool grave-diggers went out on strike. The government seemed paralysed by the extent of the strikes and stoppages. In January and February 1979, almost 30 million working days were lost, more than three times the whole of the previous year. The strikes went on, at a diminished pace, until the minority Callaghan government fell from power at the general election in May.

*Of course, many commentators gave exaggerated, politically prejudiced, verdicts on the Winter of Discontent. Not all workers were on strike all the time. Many of them were very brief and unco-ordinated. Some of the wage claims, including by the miners, had much justification at an inflationary period even if high wage settlements made that inflation worse. Many were provoked by insensitive and right-wing employers with poor management skills. But it would be absurd to deny that something very unusual and alarming was taking place’ A total of 29,474,000 working days were lost in 1979, easily the worst since 1943 (the next worse were also in the seventies, the second highest in 1972 with 23,909,000 and the third 1975 with 14,750,000). In all, 4,583,000 workers were involved in 1979 and there was a massive loss of production. The psyche of the country was deeply shaken.*

Closely intertwined with the industrial conflicts of the seventies, of course, was the decline of the economy. Despite repeated balance of payments problems and the forced devaluation of the pound in 1967, the Labour government of the sixties kept things reasonably stable. Employment was high; inflation under control. Economic historians wrote of a ‘golden age’ of the economy which lasted from 1945 to 1973. However, the Labour years had been one of frequent crisis, with frequent recourse to bailouts from the US Treasury. The plan for four per cent a year economic growth had manifestly failed, and the growth rate in 1964 – 70 had, if anything, been below that of the previous six years under the Tories. The new department supposed to

promote growth, the Department of Economic Affairs under George Brown had been humiliatingly abolished. From the early seventies, the dark clouds rolled in.

The old nostrums, those of Keynes and Beveridge, which had governed social and economic policy since the war under both major parties, now seemed no longer valid. Increasingly, economic writers suggested that Keynesianism, with its expansionary pump-priming economics and positive use of the deficit in finance, was proving out of date. It paid insufficient attention to the global economy and to inflation (in fact, an inaccurate account of Keynes's own views). For many decades, following Keynes, governments had regarded a return of pre-war unemployment as the main danger to be avoided. Now economists, especially in the United States, urged that inflation not unemployment was the major evil to be identified, and this should be checked through strict controls of the money supply. This was the burden of a growing number within the Conservative Party, attracted by the monetarist doctrines of the Chicago economist, Milton Friedman. Particular evangelists for this viewpoint were the maverick right-winger, Enoch Powell. With the theoretical basis for analysing weaknesses of the British economy discredited, politicians found themselves in the unknown without a map and without a compass.

Throughout the seventies the endemic structural problems of Britain's economic performance plagued every government and provided painful experiences for working citizens. The Heath government which took office in June 1970 had won the election on a starkly anti-state manifesto, designed to curb central planning and to stimulate the private sector with tax cuts and other measures. Long before it fell from power, it was clear that its economic policies were a total failure. The government had the misfortune to be in power at a time when the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 led to a massive oil price inflation with the nation's balance of payments suffering badly. Heath, who had totally reversed the Selsdon Park programme in office, was now replaced in 1975 as Tory leader, by Margaret Thatcher, a far more committed supporter of monetarism. But it was now Labour which had to bear the burden of economic decline. Denis Healey, Labour's powerful Chancellor from March 1974 had to grapple with a new phenomenon that of 'stagflation' with inflation and unemployment both rising at the same time. In 1975, with inflation approaching 30 per cent, his policies seemed about to collapse in ruins but he was rescued by Jack Jones who committed the unions to a flat-rate wage increase of £6 a week – a proposal which, of course, was also strongly egalitarian. But by the autumn of 1976 the British economy seemed at a critical point. In the end, the IMF granted the government \$3.9 billion credit as against a \$2.5 billion cut in domestic expenditure. For the next eighteen months, the government did much better. But the pressures of the 'winter of discontent' were overturning the government's policies once again, and when Callaghan left office in May 1979 the economic warning signs were all too visible. Britain's standing as the sick man of Europe seemed all too clearly confirmed.

Another alarming feature of British experience in the seventies was the polarization of its politics. Since the second world war, despite the harshness of party disputes, there was relatively consensual aspects to political life. The mixed economy, the welfare state, full employment, decolonization in the old empire, collaboration with the US in overseas affairs but steadfast resistance to involvement in war, as in Vietnam, were common to all the major parties. In the seventies, it all changed and turned very sour. In both the Labour and the Conservative parties there were sharp moves to the extremes. Worryingly for both parties, two-party politics in which the big parties aggregated up to 90 of the vote for themselves, was giving way to a more fluid system in which the Liberal Party showed a brisk revival under Jeremy Thorpe, challenges threatened the Labour ascendancy in both Scotland and Wales from the nationalist parties, and individual revolts against their party's leaders were more numerous. British politics seemed pluralist, almost unrecognisable.

Finally, it seemed not only to be time of industrial conflict, economic decline and political extremism, but a period of violence. The most visible indication of this came with terrifying events in Northern Ireland. After

the relative optimism felt about the civil rights movement in 1969 – 70, when Callaghan handled Ulster at the Home Office, the advent of the Conservatives, with Reginald Maudling now dealing with the province, saw things go rapidly downhill. It chimed in too with other manifestations of violent behaviour in British life, public and private, unfamiliar if not unknown before. There were still racial tensions in areas with black communities from the Commonwealth which were to explode in riots and conflict with the police in Liverpool, Tottenham and other places in the eighties. The Wilson government responded constructively with the Race Relations Board being set up in 1976 while a think-tank, the Runnymede Trusts monitored acts of discrimination against coloured ethnic minorities in the law courts and the workplace, but tension remained. Football supporters had become increasingly aggressive since England's World Cup victory in 1966, and mob violence and gang warfare were a regular feature of town life on Saturday afternoons, terrifying for ordinary citizens who lived in the neighbourhood. The police recorded a rising toll of cases of domestic violence – 89,599 in 1974 alone - including a growing tally of rape and wife-battering cases.

Consumer affluence generally improved as shown by the purchase of consumer goods such as cars and the rapidly growing number of holidays spent on continental Europe. Without lapsing into the frivolity of the so-called 'swinging sixties' and 'permissiveness' of the sixties, much of the population seemed reasonably content with their lot. In the world of culture and the arts, in its films, drama and searching television documentaries like 'Kathy Come Home', Britain seemed as creative as ever. It retained its dominance in pop music and popular fashion. In the Sixties and Seventies, British groups won the Eurovision song contest. The Beatles and the Rolling Stones still captivated the young all over the world. It should also be said that some aspects of challenge in the seventies were portents of future progress for this country. British women had not moved on from their traditional unambitious role earlier on, despite the flamboyance of the 'swinging sixties'. Young women remained fairly conventional in their social and moral attitudes (including pre-marital sex), despite the *frisson* they caused amongst young men with their miniskirts and absorption in pop culture. The seventies was different. Works such as Germaine Greer's *Female Eunuch* (1970) and the publishing house 'Virago' opened up new world of female self-expression and a more critical attitude to the traditional limited horizons bred in young British females almost from birth. Journalists like Jill Tweedie and others on the *Guardian's* Women's Page became apostles of a more adventurous, rebellious way of life. A major stimulus was the extension of higher education with women entering universities and colleges in far greater numbers, indeed coming in time to provide a majority of Britain's students. All Oxford and Cambridge's colleges would now admit women. It would take a long time for glass and other ceilings to be destroyed in women's access to major posts in business and the professions, but progress was made in the seventies. Labour governments also helped with the 1970 Equal Pay Act, and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975.

The land was tortured by innumerable crises during that decade but it had its elements of stability and progress. In the future, many would hail Margaret Thatcher as the pilot who weathered the storms and restored order and national self-confidence. In some ways she undoubtedly did so, though at grave social cost. She also converted New Labour to many of her essential principles. But the decade of Heath, Wilson and Callaghan, had its own successes, as an exercise in survival and, in the case of Europe, brilliant vision. Perhaps the so-called dark ages when the lights went out veiled a process of readjustment and renewal. Britain remained a land if not of glory at least of hope.